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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
to the decedent or to a third party. Extending such reasoning to its
natural conclusion would mean that any widow's allowance that is
actually paid would qualify for the marital deduction. Further, even
a life estate with a remainder over would appear to qualify for the
marital deduction as to such amounts as are actually received by the
life tenant.
OHIO'S POSITION
The provisions of the Ohio Revised Code that authorize the
granting of a widow's allowance 2 require the appraisers of the de-
ceased's estate to make an allowance sufficient to support a widow
for twelve months.23  The Ohio courts have regarded the widow's
allowance as a statutory claim that vests in the surviving spouse at
the decedent's death.24 . This allowance would undoubtedly qualify
for the marital deduction under the construction given in the Quivey
decision, or, more important, the Ohio widow's allowance should
qualify under the narrower construction given in the previous cases,2
5
which construction appears to be more sound and .rnore likely to
endure.
FRED KURLANbER
LABOR LAW - THE STEEL STRIKE - NATIONAL SAFETY IMPERILED
On June 30, 1959, contracts between the United Steelworkers of
America and the steel companies expired. Collective bargaining
failed, leaving several unresolved labor disputes. This resulted in
an industry-wide steel strike of one-half million workers. Within fif-
teen weeks, because of the steel shortage, hundreds of thousands of
production workers in related industries were laid off. In early Oc-
tober President Eisenhower created a Board of Inquiry which at-
tempted.to determine the issues in this strike. After the board ren-
dered its written report to the President, as required by law,' the At-
torney General was instructed to commence injunctive proceedings
against the Union and ninety-six steel companies.
The injunction was sought in the Federal District Court for the
22. OHIO REv. CODE SS 2117.20-.24.
23. OHIO REV. CODE § 2117.20.
24. In re Croke's Estate, 155 Ohio St. 434, 99 N.E.2d 483 (1951); Raleigh v. Raleigh, 153
Ohio St. 160, 91 N.E.2d 241 (1950); In re Estate of Wreede, 106 Ohio App. 324, 154
N.E.2d 756 (1958); Estate of John W. Priest, 156 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio P. Ct. 1958).
25. One provision of the statute authorizing the Ohio widow's allowance, OHIO REV. CODE
2105.21, appears to subject the allowance to the terminable interest rule. This provision pro-
hibits the surviving spouse from taking if she does not survive the decedent by thirty days.
However, this provision falls under an exception to the terminable interest rule. INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (3), provides that if the failure of the interest can only occur by
the death of the surviving spouse within six months of the decedent's death, the interest will
not be considered terminable.
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Western District of Pennsylvania under the National Emergency
provision, section 2082 of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947, hereafter referred to as the Taft-Harley Act. Upon its find-
ings of fact the district court enjoined the continuance of the steel
strike for the statutory eighty-day period and required the steel com-
panies to make their plants available for resumption of production.3
The judgment of the court of appeals4 upholding the district court's
decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The Court held that
the strike had imperiled national safety.5
The significance of this decision lies in the fact that it was a case
of first impression, wivith respect to interpreting the "national health
or safety" clause in the Taft-Hartley Act. Although labor strikes had
been enjoined under this clause by the district courts in many prior
instances, this was the first time that the Supreme Court granted
certiorari and rendered a decision enjoining a strike which imperiled
national health or safety.
In a per curiam opinion, section 208 of the Taft-Hartley Act8 re-
ceived careful scrutiny. Since it was generally accepted by both
parties that the strike affected the entire steel industry, the first con-
dition7 needed for the issuance of an injunction was met. The real
question arose over the second condition,8 which was whether the na-
tion's health or safety would be imperiled by the strike. The argu-
ment centered upon the words "national health," the petitioner urging
that they only meant the physical health of the nation. Respondent,
the Government, attached a broader meaning, contending that the
country's economic well-being and general welfare was the correct
connotation of "national health." The Court did not resolve this
question; it held instead that the findings of fact below indicated that
the steel strike had imperiled national safety alone.9  The Supreme
1. labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 206, 61 Star. 155 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 176 (1958).
2. 61 Sta. 155 (1947), as amended, 63" Sta. 107 (1949), 29 U.S.C. § 178 (1958).
3. United States v. United Steelworkers of America, 178 F. Supp. 297 (W.D. Pa. 1959).
4. United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 271 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1959).
5. United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959).
6. 61 Star. 155 (1947), as amended, 63 Star. 107 (1940), 29 U.S.C. § 178 (1958), which
follows in part:
a) Upon receiving a report from a board of inquiry the President may direct the
Attorney General to petition any district court of the United States having jurisdic-
tion of the parties to enjoin such strike or lock-out or the continuing thereof, and if
the court finds that such threatened or actual strike or lock-out - .
(i) affects an entire industry or a substantial part thereof engaged in trade,
commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States
or with foreign nations, or engaged in the production of goods for commerce; and
(ii) if permitted to occur or continue, will imperil the national health or
safety, it shall have jurisdiction to enjoin any such stiike or lock-out, or the continu-
ing thereof, and to make such other orders as may be appropriate.
7. See note 6 supra, § 208 (a) (i).
8. See note 6 supra, 5 208 (a) (ii).
9. United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 42 (1959).
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Court relied upon evidence of the strike's effect on the nation's de-
fense and space programs, particularly the military missile and
manned-satellite projects. In a concurring opinion rendered later,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Harlan completely adhered
to the majority view.' °
Mr. Justice Douglas, the lone dissenter, contended that "national
health" should be interpreted narrowly." He believed that such
was the intention of Congress. Regarding "national safety," Doug-
las agreed with petitioner. Both felt that if several steel mills were
to be re-opened, the nation's defense needs would be satisfied, while
the right of organized labor to strike would still be protected. But
there is no legal support for this plan in statutes or in case law.
The Supreme Court gave equal consideration to the other two
issues in the instant case: First, petitioner contended that the dis-
trict court did not have the right to exercise equitable jurisdiction to
enjoin the steel strike. This contention was disapproved by the
Court. Second, neither the Taft-Hartley Act in its entirety, nor sec-
tion 208 in particular, was held to be constitutionally invalid. Sec-
tion 208 did not violate the constitutional limitation which prohibited
the-courts from exercising powers of a legislative or executive nature.
The concurring justices elaborated more fully on this point, declaring
that section 208 entrusted to the courts only the determination of a
"case or controversy." Therefore, section 208 (a) was within the
judicial power as contemplated in the Constitution. 2
The holding of the Supreme Court in this, its first encounter with
section 208 of the Taft-Hartley Act, was undoubtedly correct. The
majority justified its position on the three main issues by relying upon
cases'" decided prior to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act. The
constitutionality and jurisdictional questions were discussed fully in
the lengthy concurring opinion.
The Court's position was essentially the same as that taken by a
lower federal court in United States v. American Locomotive Com-
pany.' 4 There, the district court cited two instances"5 in which fed-
eral courts had upheld the constitutionality of section 208. In the
Locomotive case, the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, after the
circuit court had affirmed, lent strength to the district court's hold-
ing.
10. Id. at 44 (concurring opinion).
11. Id. at 65 (dissenting opinion).
12. Id. at 62 (concurring opinion).
13. See Federal Radio Comm'n v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930); Sanitary Dist.
of Chicago v. United States, 226 U.S. 405 (1925); Keller v. Potomac Power Co., 261
U.S. 428 (1923); United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888).
14. 109 F. Supp. 78 (W.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd, United States v. United Steelworkers of
America, 202 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 915 (1953).
15. See United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 89 F. Supp. 187 (D.D.C. 1950),
af'd, 190 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cit. 1951); United States v. International Longshoremen, 78 F.
Supp. 710 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
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